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This book is part of a series of connected works designed to demon-
strate the ways in which deconstruction, in so far as it is a way of 
reading, is also a form of action with ethical, social, and political 
consequences. Deconstruction has often been branded escapist, irre-
sponsible, or worse, for what it appears to do to language and to the 
possibility of determinate meaning. Hillis Miller, now at Irvine but 
formerly one of the Yale School who did so much to promote decon-
struction in North America, clarifies and contests such charges in a 
series of readings which are remarkable for their patience, intelligi-
bility, and quiet determination to set the record straight. As befits an 
accomplished theorist and comparativist, Mil ler moves easily between 
disciplines, language, cultural traditions, in the name of narration, 
reading, and teaching, activities which he regards as interrelated, 
inescapably and infinitely complex, and enormously important. In the 
course of six long and demanding chapters, Mil ler demonstrates time 
and again how and why we should continue to read Ovid, James, 
Kleist, Melville, and Blanchot. The result is a book worth the effort 
and worth the price: it is also, I suggest, a book deeply flawed and 
unduly suffused with pathos. 
In The Ethics of Reading, Mil ler was at great pains to re-appro-
priate the ethical in the name of deconstructive reading. In the 
forthcoming Hawthorne and History, he will , presumably, offer a 
sustained defence of deconstruction against the charge that it attempts 
to be ahistorical, if not anti-historical. In Versions of Pygmalion, he 
tries to establish that "The coming alive of a statue that one has made 
and then fallen in love with expresses in a fable the act of personifica-
tion essential to all storytelling and all storyreading" (vii) . Here, in 
a manner reminiscent of the New Critics, he privileges a particular 
rhetorical figure in order to facilitate his own reading of texts pro-
duced in widely differing historical and cultural contexts. Personifica-
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tion or prosopopoeia is hailed as sine qua non, the master trope that 
makes possible in the first instance narration and the activities it 
supports. Such rhetorical essentialism is grounded in a reading of 
Ovid designed to establish a cautionary double truth: " i n the cruel 
justice of the gods we see the terrible performative power that figures 
of speech may have. Tropes tend to materialize in the real world in 
ways that are ethical, social, and political. The Metamorphoses shows 
what aberrant figurative language can do. The power of the gods to 
intervene in human history is the allegorization of this linguistic 
power" ( i ). Miller will use the example of Pygmalion in Book Ten 
to substantiate a rhetorical economy that takes its cues from Austin 
and de M a n . Agency, value, accountability, indeed material instancia-
tion as such, each alike betrays the militant "tendency" of figurae ex 
machina to keep the human story going. Prosopopoeia has an unpre-
dictable, residually mysterious plot which human beings replicate, and 
the originary enactment of that plot, a "prosopopoeia of prosopo-
poeia," can be found not in the behaviour of entities already personi-
fied (and represented elsewhere in the Metamorphoses), but in the 
story of Galatea, "an ivory statue that becomes a gir l " (6). 
Miller moves from the unpredictable distribution and deferral of 
"guilt and punishment" ( 11 ) in Ovid to a shrewdly chosen range of 
later analogues, beginning with a reading of What Maisie Knew 
which attempts to establish how later creation can constitute a "repe-
tition of Pygmalion's carving of Galatea" (49), and how James, the 
narrator, the reader, and "Maisie herself" (49) all act prosopopetic-
ally. Mil ler reveals himself to be James's ideal reader, not only in his 
receptivity to the labyrinthine interplay of ethical, psychological, and 
economic possibility, but also in his own deeply recessed, partially 
ironized aesthetic idealism. Where his treatment of Ovid left one 
wondering about a number of matters, including the undervalued 
obduracy of the physical, and the claims of simile and metaphor to 
prosopopoeia's title of master trope, so also Miller's treatment of James 
remains in several important respects inadvertently problematic. He 
can claim, for example, that in What Maisie Knew James's prefer-
ence for a female rather than a male child shared by divorced parents 
("Boy or girl would do, but I see a girl") proves that in such cases 
"the act of invention freely exceeds its sources" (49). But what kind 
of excess is being alluded to here? What kind of freedom does "freely" 
denote? A feminist reader would surely suspect this appeal to imagina-
tive autonomy as grounded in patriarchal assumption, and proceed 
to demonstrate how the Jamesian gaze that apprehends a girl as the 
subject of knowledge and as prematurely knowing subject is deter-
mined by the author's host culture in ways that even (or especially) 
an omniscient male narrator will fail to "see." Where Mil ler follows 
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James in recognizing only the constraints of "verisimilitude . . . [and] 
the intrinsic implications of the 'subject,' its 'full ironic truth" ' (48-
49) , other readers may bridle at the persistence of an all too familiar 
aesthetic ideology behind the operations of "visionary creativity." 
Selective sensitivity is all that any of us can plausibly lay claim to, 
and I do not wish to overemphasize what I take to be the deficiencies 
of Miller's latest book. However, as well as being somewhat uneven 
in his discussion of gender, he seems significantly more severe with 
historicist and Marxist theory and criticism than with their rhetorical 
equivalents. Indeed, Miller seems driven by a need to "rehabilitate" 
de M a n by making his own work an extended and uncritical gloss on 
de Man's writings. He chooses to discuss authors like Kleist who are 
prominent in the de Manían canon, reaffirms a de Manian version of 
"forgetting" ( i i 2 f f . ) as well as disfiguring and defacement, and has 
regular recourse to praise such as this : 
Paul de Man is right in his shrewd adaptation of Hölderlin's "Es ereignet 
aber das Wahre" into a formula for what happens in reading. Hölderlin's 
phrase, says de Man, "can be freely translated, 'What is true is what is 
bound to take place.' And, in the case of the reading of a text, what takes 
place is a necessary understanding." (21; emphasis added) 
Miller used this passage against deconstruction's enemies in " A n 
Open Letter to Professor Jon Wiener" in order to show how de M a n 
gave "ful l authority to the text to determine what happens in any act 
of reading" (Responses: On Paul de Man's Wartime Journalism 
340). Here, while remembering his friend's empowerment of the text 
at the expense of author and reader (a problematic version of 
agency), Miller makes of Hölderlin's reflexive version of the truth of 
what happens ("Es ereignet sich aber das Wahre") something 
mysteriously transitive (another problematic version of agency). I 
cannot with any certainty attribute to Miller himself the dropping of 
the "sich" from Hölderlin's line, and I read it therefore not as a 
Freudian slip but rather as the turn of contingency during material 
production of the text, a turning in effect against an overtextualizing 
of agency and necessity which Miller unequivocally endorses in a note 
(:251). The move from poetic formulation to theoretical "formula" 
is made possible by de Man's translating "freely," but once again we 
may ask what is the nature of the freedom in question, in what does 
the shrewdness of this "adaptation" consist? Mil ler follows de M a n 
in wishing to claim both necessity and indeterminacy as effects of lan-
guage, but in so doing he composes a series of readings which can 
themselves be read as (though not reduced to) an allegory of amity 
which rather dangerously reduces dialectic to the asymmetry of tropes 
(95) and causality to a "fundamentally linguistic event" (130). 
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Deborah E . McDowell and Arnold Rampersad, eds. Slavery and the 
Literary Imagination: Selected Papers from the English Institute, 
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Had this collection, the thirteenth in the new series from the English 
Institute, been published, say, fifteen years ago, it would probably 
have contained four essays on various features of Harriet Beecher 
Stowe's work, maybe one on Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man as a 
modernist quasi-slave narrative, maybe another on Faulkner and the 
revisioning of the discourses of the slave trade, and perhaps, if the 
editors had been daring, an essay on a slave narrative itself (and, 
more than likely, that would have been the very unrepresentative 
Booker T . Washington's Up From Slavery). It is almost fortunate 
that such a collection would not have been imaginable fifteen years 
ago, because the collection Deborah McDowell and Arnold Ramper-
sad have brought together now, preparing the way for the scholarship 
in African-American studies in the 1990s, represents the best of a new 
attitude towards what is helpfully called "Slavery and the Literary 
Imagination." 
Instead of the assortment of essays I imagined in the scenario above, 
this collection contains seven essays, all but one of which deal with 
African-American writers. Moreover, the one exception, Carolyn 
Karcher's study of Lydia Maria Child's A Romance of the Republic 
(1867), is in fact an examination of the imaginative limitations 
suffered by even so thoroughly engaged an abolitionist as was Child. 
It is an essay that is not a counterpoint to the rest of the series, but 
very much participates in the general trajectory of the collection. And 
that general trajectory is primarily aimed at tracing potential origins 
and describing moments of revisionist energies. 
Two of the essays are interested in establishing the beginnings of the 
African-American literary tradition in the discourses surrounding the 
institution of slavery and the experiences of ex-slaves. The volume 
starts off with James Olney's essay which examines Frederick 
Douglass's Narrative (1845) and Washington's Up From Slavery 
( 1901 ) as the constitutional texts of the "founding fathers" of another 
American discourse, that of the "Afro-American nation" (8). In the 
